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Rationalization essays to understand urban violence

“All episodes of urban violence have several common aspects: they emerge in poor neighborhoods, in stigmatized spaces, where excluded population lives, brought by badly integrated youngsters from immigrant origin.”

Translated from Carmen Innerarity (2009) “Comunidades de violencia” in *Violencia colectiva y extrañeidad* – revista Anthropos n.222, Barcelona, pages 169-189:173.

Greek uprising begun by 6 December 2009 and, even after the riots including the burn of several entire buildings in Athens, Greek population support it for some time. By the middle of February, the social challenging movement breaks down and old violent provocative tactics of the police and of the groups opposed to the police takes the floor, as rituals, again.

The lack of use of State legitimate power, police power, on the streets, during this period, showed some kind of contradictions. The lack of political support to the police activity breaks down the efficacy of police activities. The fact that the protagonist of these events has been upper-middle class youngsters – and not sons of excluded people – only means that the same lack of political courage to discipline them at home and at school converge with the situation on the streets, where they are protected against the common police proceedings. Therefore, the youngsters’ indiscipline turned in violent behavior was free to evolve in social event. Let’s call this approach the *disciplinary* approach.

What happened was only an explosion of social irrational violence against authority, and it can happen with any social class group. It should be repressed, and that is the State function. Other people emphasize the political problem: democracy should be able to integrate marginal people, even if they do not produce rational claims.

Some people lived the events as a emotional relieve of social tensions and a confirmation of the arguments claiming lack of functionality at the political and economic system level. The events are seen as a warning and an opportunity to look at it in a rational way, trying to develop lessons for the future, not only in Greece but elsewhere, as in the Southern European Union countries. Let’s call this approach the *futurable* approach.

A third kind of positioning comes from the people who feel priority to support the pluralist political party democratic system prestige, claiming that this has been, the last 30 years, the institutional support of Greek development and integration on the EU. Pragmatically neither the police nor the marginal people should be priority, since both should submit to the prestige of the representative political institutions, for modernization sake, against the traditional influence of the society, such as the influence of the familiar social links between people who relate them selves as large families in order to organize social safety private nets and economies, way from the market and from the rational procedures. Let’s call this approach the *modernizing* approach.

Political Greek parties do not support the uprising, except part of the leftwing parties. Anyway the government felt the need, during the events, to announce the calling for anticipated elections. At the end, looking at the pools, the bigger consequence has been the political penalization of the

Conservative party supporting the government,¹ which popularity has been decreasing given the crises and its own fragility (for instance on dealing with prisoners, with whom the ministry of justice bargained a agreement in order to favor the living conditions inside overcrowded penitentiary, after a collective hunger strike of thousands of prisoners, in November 2009). Political system does continue working as usual.

Frighten and startle

To die young, at 15 years old, from a brutal situation is hard to accept. Anyway every 3 minutes one child dies in the world for hunger or thirst. Sometimes one can see them on TV. Other times one heard about victims of war in Iraq, in Palestine, in Sri Lanka and many other parts of the world.

It happens to us to blame the victims, as one do when it is the case of domestic violence. Even the victims do blame themselves very often about what happens. To transform the victims into survivors of violence is one of the main liberation goals for activists and social scientists against domestic violence (cf. Michalsky 2004 and Arriaga 2005), as well as empowerment strategies for every kind of human targets.

Victimization processing does develop in two ways: a) social support to the victims, eventually producing survivor heroes' models, which is very energy expending transforming social procedure; b) to blame the victim (the Iraqis, the Palestinians or the Tamils) as scapegoat for social impertinent situations,² which is the conservative procedure. As much as fear does develop pushing people to very active behaviors or, the reverse and more common reaction, causing people freezing behaviors.³

May 2009, by the time this paper has been written, in Bela Vista neighborhood in Setubal, Portuguese town 40 Km south of Lisbon, a police station goes under attack by bullets and cars are burned by a small group complaining against the killing of someone they knew accused of robbery. In Portugal there is no memory of an assault of this violence against the police. Some month earlier, for the first time, a demonstration faced the police station in Casal da Boba, Amadora, near Lisbon, calling for justice for the killing by a policeman of a 14 years old boy from a black and poor neighborhood. By then, police feared the same kind of ignition event could happen, as in Greece. The same ingredients could be present: the killing of a youngster by the police without a forceful explanation, the crisis lack of confidence social ambience, the example of the startle of other young people, in Paris and in Athens, could develop the same kind of consequences. It was not the case.

Police internal reports leaked to a newspaper brought to the media the counter-information about the infiltration of European non identified leftwing international movements to explain the (small and fragile) anew activity reacting to the consequences of police shooting, anticipating any public opinion reaction.

In Greece a killing by the police can develop reactions such as violent protests against the police in central Athens. Athens displays a demonstration culture unknown in Lisbon. It is possible to a small number of people to stop the traffic at the center of town – in Syntagma Square in front of the Parliament – for days, as it happened for 4 days announcing a demonstration against

¹ Cf. http://www.predict09.eu/default/en-us/state_analyses.aspx.

² To discuss this question read Girard (1985).

³ About fear and Greek uprising read Does "Outcast Spirit" in this 9th ESA Conference.

unemployment in the first days of April 2009. Democracy in Greece means not to comment on demonstration strategies of any kind of people, even if the social representativity is null (it is annoying to the traffic, but it is all). Ritual demonstrations from marginal politic groups, such as anarchists and leftwing groups, happens regularly and they go around the main streets of down town, between Syntagma and Omonia squares, as an ellipse Mary-go-round circuit. Demonstrators and police know how to act ritually. During the rally some young men try and break glasses from banks and state institutions windows. At the end of the rally the police explode gas bombs to disperse the mob, as usual proceeding.

It would be frightening in Lisbon. It is a ritual in Athens. “Violence is not good or bad.” – answer an interviewed woman who did participate on the social movements during December 2008 till February 2009. “It depends on situation”. Ritual violence between marginal political groups and police do not frighten most of the Athenians. *Can it startle them?*

The events⁴

The second week of December 2008 riots in Athens were felt as a treat to European Union political stability. Politicians discuss their fears about the probability of social uprising in Europe, continuing the Paris riots 2005, that spread to other European towns, and the spirit of May 1968 that French President Sarkozy soundly disapproved during his political campaign to President. Anarchists and other marginalized activists groups all over Europe claim there is the time for ending the *status quo*.

The six December, by the sun fall, at Exarchia neighborhood, a police shot down a 15 years old boy. The neighbors lighted candles on the floor where the boy fallen. This Saturday at the time youngsters communicate each other by mobile *sms* and by email to find how to spend the week-end, the big news brought many of them (all of them?) to down town to join together, during the time older people, as politicians and journalists, prepare their dinner. The protests endure all night long, till early in the morning. Some protesting fires were detected during the night. Still nothing uncommon for the Athenian protest culture. The police prefer prepare its public defense and to live the floor to violent protestors, knowing that the institutional support by the government would not come. Police is unpopular and normally the government would not back the policemen or the police.

Sunday the political discussion about what happened divided the people. The police said that the agents were provoked with violence by the youngsters before policemen run to avoid kids hiding in the neighborhood known to be the place where marginal politicians from leftwing do meet each other. Other version said that no major provoking action has been displayed. The cause of the shooting would be only the police knowledge that these boys were Anarchist activists and, as such, display hate against the police. For instance, they compare policemen to a donut: “police are good when they have a hole in the middle”. Police feel frightened and outraged by this kind of sayings.

The news that the police, arriving after the shooting to search for evidence, has put out of scene, with their feet, the candles in the spot, decided many people about who should be backed in this matter. Other relevant element is that the police style version that comes first to the media, emphasizing the stigma elements of the neighborhood (marginal culture and politics though,

⁴ For the short field research in Athens I have to thank Gonçalo Sousa, Effi Lambropoulou, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Panayis Panayotopoulos, Michalis Spourdalakis, Valia Dimopoulou, Costas Ele. The only responsibility for what wrong information or interpretation I wrote in this paper is mine.

youngsters meeting point with radicals), do not work as usual because the boy shoot down come from the high-middle class, known by many school boys of his age and their parents.

A leftwing parliamentary party call for a demonstration the Sunday and the streets of Athens become full of people of all kinds, marching to the central police station. The media echoes the feeling that “this is ours sons moving with their hearts”. Two relevant elements: a) a high-middle class kid is our son; b) the youngsters have the right and the need to express themselves in public, which is a good thing in Greek political culture (not in Portuguese political culture at all, for instance). After the demobilization, still, many demonstrations against the police spread not only by Athens but by many Greek towns.

Till this moment, said a Greek academic political observer, nothing unusual happened as a popular reaction to the police killing; even one can feel an unusual high trend of violence. New has been the consequence of the Monday opening classes. The students of secondary school, in Athens and elsewhere, decided to leave school and attack police stations in different Greek towns. The destructive actions arise brought by anti-capitalist minded people that address bank, administration buildings, well know international brand cloths stores, and other capitalist symbols. Other kind of destruction did address any kind of store, such as supermarkets, mobile and electronic sell stores and other kind of stores youngsters have knowledge of their existence and functioning. Immigrants and lumpen people joined the mob taking advantage of the freezing situation of the police and the opportunity to bring home products they do not have the chance to buy in every day life.

The violence rolls and the buildings on fire do not received the fire men attention, since they fear the lack of police protection, with whom they feel solidarity as corporation. In same neighborhoods, where the police stations are attacked, neighbors asked police to abandon the neighborhood, closing the station.

Thursday precarious workers unions show their support to the uprising movements and three of them occupied the head quarters of the Union’s federation. The riots continued as well as the spontaneous demonstration. Some political parties do support the demonstrators and others condemn them. The political discussion between the political parties does not affect directly the action on the streets.

Wednesday was the funeral of the youngster who die and the night of a football European Cup match. The violence continued, not only by the mob. For instance, it has been filmed some policemen pointing guns to the people in the funeral and shooting them to the air, in a menace to the lives of the people around. It circulates suspicions about the participation of undercover policemen on the riots, even in destructive kind of action, during the freezing time of police control of the streets. From this day on the youngsters come back to school and the social movement continues without them. Everyday demonstration happened in Athens till middle of February. Growing cultural activities were record, many of them referring directly to the events. New solidarities were found, for instance when a long time free space of an old building was reconverted on a garden produced by the neighbors or an anew occupation of an empty building for cultural proposes. Any new violent event in Athens calls international attention, manly in Europe, as a test to the social reaction to the installed crisis.

Comparing Greece and Portugal political culture

The Greek political culture contrast with Portuguese political culture in the way both refer to marginal political groups. The spectrum of political parties and its pool and elections records are

similar. But the respect for minority political actions is different. In Portugal, for instance, it is forbidden by law and it is a crime to stop the traffic as a political or civic demonstration. This legislation will probably display in the Greek political consciousness the same astonished emotion as the criminalization with prison penalties of the non-payment of restaurant, hotel or transport bills can display when a European visits Brazil.

How happens that two recent democracies (both arising from the defeat of dictatorships in 1974) entered the European Union in the middle eighties, counting 10 and 11 million inhabitants, with strong cultural presence in the world, developing fast from a peasant society in the seventies to a new economy society centered in two metropolises (the bigger in the middle and the second one in the North of the countries), both are religiously faithful people to the Roman Catholic Church and to Orthodox Christian traditions, with strong touristic industries, at the European periphery in strategic areas, can be, at the same time, so similar – at the level of development, traditional way of life, political structure – and so different in its political and urban culture? With the same kind of ingredients, these two people happen to develop very different kinds (and good) cuisine traditional menus.

Besides common social structure and political integration at the same political region, the history of both countries, including their different strategic geographic position and religious traditions, influence their specific political cultures. Both count big Diasporas (5 million Portuguese live outside the country and 7 million Greeks live outside their national territory) with different strategic options. Portuguese choose Brazil (of course), Canada and North America and mostly France and Germany. More recently Spain and Switzerland become common destinations for Portuguese emigrants. Greek emigrants choose Egypt, near by, Canada, North America and Australia.

There is no place or time to discuss history. Nevertheless a historical episode of Greek recent history needs to be considered, because it is central to the uprising events in Greece.

In November 1973, the 17th, the students protesting against the dictatorship were brutally repressed by the police, few weeks before the end of the Colonel's regime.⁵ Many young people died this day. Till today Greek population remember this day as a sad holiday to remember the need of the political struggle and sacrifice to the good of the people. The importance of this popular feeling is institutionalized by the law that forbids the entry of the police force into the University campus.

Exarchia is the closest neighborhood to the Polytechnic University to where marginal political groups can run to as a sanctuary against the police pursuits. The neighborhood becomes a known center for marginal political and cultural activists meetings, as well as social and civic organizations to settle, and imprinting and book industries. It becomes a symbol of political resistance to police activity, both intelligence and repressive practices.

When the young boy has been killed, the 6th December, by a policeman, the first broadcasted police information talked about a violent activist's provocation against the police. This information results not of a positive representation of the events. It results from a *status quo* situation culturally produced by the political game developed at Exarchia neighborhood between the police, running for its authority, and the Greek marginal political groups, developing strategies of political existence in the spot.

The name of Exarchia has brought ambiguously to the light to European media as a bad neighborhood, imagined as a social marginal neighborhood, to support the legitimacy of the

⁵ Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athens_Polytechnic_uprising.

police work persecuting alleged criminals. In fact Exarchia displays a marginal aesthetic and not a social exclusion problem. The boy shouted down belonged to an upper middle class family. Something was wrong in the police story, this time. Should it be possible in 2008 Europe the civic police to develop repressive strategies against marginal political activists? Is it possible that the radical complaints against “fascist” police brutality heard in different parts of Europe, as a mantra, become irremediably true and naked in Athens? Can this evidence explain, at the same time, the spread of the protest movements in Greece – where the all picture has been understood immediately – and the enthusiasm of anarchists everywhere in Europe about the uprising events in Greece? Can it explain also the fears of those how understand the new ideological difficulties arising with the financial crises – how to explain the massive subsidies from the neo-liberal State to those who need less and can be personally and criminally responsible for the crisis, when the poor people should not be subsidize to avoid bad unproductive habits? – added now to the ideological difficulties to stigmatize political though against capitalism?

It is a fact that the information about the social condition of the boy killed, as a high level condition, as well as the social condition of the Exarchia neighborhood, as a middle class neighborhood, were not clearly presented by the news, since neither the police, neither the marginal political groups, neither the politicians were interested on supporting this information. For the police this information runs against its legitimating story of bad people and criminals persecution, most of the time identified as other kind of people, what psychologists call the generalized Other. For the most enthusiastic marginal political groups that used the events to link themselves out of Greece by information networking, it has been important to support the claim of the police that the 15 years boy was an anarchist. All Greece, in fact, has been presented as an anarchist friendly country.⁶ For political personal it is an embarrassment to accept they know that the police target the mission to fight marginal political groups, or marginal social people, or do kill without a very good reason, or that police should know how to differentiate high-middle class punks from genuine marginal.

These complex ideological situation created by the killing and the uprising protesting against it freeze the police and the political actions, opening space to marginal politics. It becomes difficult to every party to understand and to explain what happened. The media don't target that understanding or explanation. They just spread “neutral” easy images of “real life” as violence to call viewers attention. Since viewers and consumers did support the riots against the *status quo*, the media compete for deepening this perspective, till the mood of the people change. Then almost all of them follow the new trend of condemning violence.

The authorities were frozen by their own mutual secrets (the political use of police force to political control) and public contradictions (should it be condemn the policemen who killed the boy in a street persecution?). The radical politic groups were surprised by the opportunity of popularity and do not understand neither why the youngsters used their ritual path during these hot days nor what kind of support this social movement will bring?⁷

Recent Bela Vista - Setubal violent events frighten Portuguese common political sense because it is unusual (there is no civic or political violence ritual, as there is in Paris, Barcelona or Athens), it is against state institutions (Portuguese feel generally they depend on it for most of the time and of the situations), it is violent (it causes security problems to the neighborhood, given the

⁶ Many Greek people claim spontaneously, without any direct question, that anarchists are a very small number in Athens and Greece, even people who did join the movements.

⁷ Orthodox communist party did protest against the uprising and the rest of the leftwing parties did adapt to the changing popular feeling about the sequence of events. All marginal political groups enjoyed the moments.

target games from the people who want to hit the police and the police against them) and it is located by a stigmatized poor neighborhood.

The street violence against State institutions in Athens is not unusual and the protagonists are not economic excluded people. They are marginal political groups claiming for real political discussion.

Authenticity of expression of political feelings and though is appreciated in Athens, even if it comes mixed with corruption (Greek people associate corruption to large family social net to social security support as well as political corruption). In Portugal, in contrast, corruptive lives develop mostly by depending on State, direct or indirectly, for job attribution and for freedom of speech. In Portugal, wherever it happen a security problem event, people claim for the local presence of a stronger police force. In Athens, fearing the attack of rioters to the police station, the neighbors ask publically for closing of the police station in the neighborhood. (No success. The police reinforce its defenses against attacks and the police station remained on the spot).

Politics of violence

For same reason, in this day of 6 December, the news of a death by a policeman started a riot that endures for several weeks and have been felt all over Greece, moving rallies in many Greek towns, and in some European capitals, where support demonstrations to the rioters have been organized. Even outside Europe, so far as Argentina and Korea, riots did startle supporters against police violence. Police call ignition events when the population startle in presence of what normally would frighten them. What reason explains the fright becomes startle?

Sociology has small experience of dealing with subjects such as war and its psychological tactics or policing and control tactics or international relations and geo-strategic tactics or politics and conspirative tactics or prisons and incarceration tactics. Most of the time sociologist and other social scientists prefer to admit that cultural work on time will regulate social violence, as Norbert Elias (1990/1939) genially presented it. Even rough Michel Foucault (1999/1975) insight on penitentiary system insist that what started once, with an technical idea of an utilitarian philosopher such as Bentham, will decline and stop to be useful the day people understand it works as a unequalitarian device, in contradiction with justice theory and social feelings. Will time really change social human nature related to violence?

Sérgio Adorno (1999) and José-Vicente Tavares-dos-Santos (2009), Brazilian sociologist experts on violence, follow Michel Wieviorka proposal of a structural configuration of violence emerging from the neo-liberal politics since the 80's. "(...) there is an impressive association between the languages of the end of 19th and 20th centuries. Crime takes the lead at public scene", notes Adorno (1999:84) quoting Lagrange & Roché. After the II World War the modern violence paradigm changed from extreme-left and extreme-right political movements, nationalist movements in the third world and class struggles violence to a new paradigm: now a day the ethnic and religious identities are prevalent as causes of most violence (op.cit.:96). "The facts have changed (...) as well as the collective perceptions about violence" (idem), they say.

Bruno Latour (2007/05) asks: aren't we too much in a rush? Are we able to explain the social mechanisms linking social structures and practical action? Can we separate our (both common people and social scientists) languages and the representations in order to be sure that the facts match with scientific representations? For instance, aren't we biased conceiving modern violence, as it is presented by Michel Wieviorka (2005), as the violence coming from out of the modern State? Does not the western state too develop ethnic and religious social differentiation? Is not it

one of the causes of social violence? Could one say that the State, referred by Max Weber as the single source of legitimate violence, can be occult whenever one analyzes modern social violence? The common conceptions of violence focus on the social illicit violence that comes from below as if the State violence were only reactive, in the name of the whole society, as criminal doctrine says. This one-sided conception does not conform to the physics concept that rules force, the principle of energy conservation.⁸ And it does not conform to the facts, since the riots emerge without police opposition. And police action only returns when riots were over. Police, and the State, has their own agenda, independent of the reaction to illicit violence. That is why the disciplinary approach of the events complains about the lack of authority. *Are the State actions preventing the future or preventing the political institutions?*

Other direction of criticism is the way sociologists do understand rational behavior. The interviewing method to the protagonists, looking for rational explanations, presupposes the notion that those who are stronger in the use of social communication tools can show more rational than other people. This approach, both theoretical and mythological, is contested regarding peasant's rationality (Iturra 1990, for example) as well because it erases emotional bases for action (Goodwin 2001). Emotions and habits have been many times the basis of the struggle for working class legitimating thinking, namely within the frame of counter-ideology Marx's thinking, waiting for the rational strategy to emerge.

Since the sixties, besides, major cultural trends are against supporting rational long narratives (cf. Lyotard 1985). Still, sociological methods do not balance the input data from those who are strong enough using the language and the communication tools, that enable them to explain and legitimate their behavior or the social behavior that is favorable to their interests, and the rest of the people, the majority of the people, who do not have neither the reflexive time nor the symbolic work skills to support their own social position or behavior. In this case, the protagonists were youngsters. Whenever the Habermas's democratic communication utopia does not become real, sociology should be able to avoid reinforcing the social inequalities through methodological discrimination.⁹ Those who know how to speak in public and those who know how to spread messages through society should have equitable opportunities to be represented by sociological studies than other people, if sociology wants to claim scientific distance from the study subject, as rational behavior.

There is a problem with violence. One can agree that it would be better to avoid it. When it happens – every day – should sociology choose a party or, before that, to try to describe and understand what is going on? Is it a question of efficiency of rational control over the bodies and minds of the people? Or is it a question of natural forms (running away or fighting back a stressful situation, for instance) of how people in society deal with their violent instinct of survival? How and why the same cause – a killing by a policeman, for instance – produces different and opposite lines of social and individual action? Why well-positioned and modern people, as German people in the 30's or Muslim terrorists these days, do develop intentional extreme and broad violence?

In order to research these kinds of problems it is not enough to look to one side of the equation, being it the causes and the effects of the events to the Greek policeman and to the Greek police,

⁸ In a closed system no energy can be destroyed or added – that is what this law says. For instance, if a fist of a person beats on a table, the table will produce an equivalence force with the same direction but the reverse sense of the force produced by the fist on the table.

⁹ A Greek sociologist Sotiris (2009) rebelled against this sociological limitation and substitute the protagonists talk calling attention to known structural reasons that could be presented by them as their problems, if they knew how and accept to talk to Greek society. Hirschman (1997) explains how emotions and violence become a long run modern ideological taboo.

being it the causes and the effects of the events to marginal political agents in Athens. Both sides are not unified and both sides depend not only on the people's action – for example, from the Greek youngsters' action – as well they depend on international action of the supporters of both sides: in this case a) the marginal political agents in Europe and in other parts of the world and b) the Greek government and its European Union allies.

The present paper cannot report on this entire picture. Its purpose is to focus on the social mechanisms that developed the people's action away from any conspirative kind of people's action manipulation.¹⁰

How can democracy work in declining social expectation?

To present modern society as something progressively approaching non-violent social justice and equity, as sociology often does (cf. Elias 1990/1939), seems not to fit with Greek uprising understanding needs, out of repressive perspective (not used by Greek authorities in this case). Youngsters' social nature does not depend on the god will of social and individual modern agents. Social science dominant paradigm does "(...) emphasis on control over body – and emotions. On top of this rational/irrational, motive/action, individual/social" epistemological divisions, claim Craig Calhoun (2001:48-49). The scientific distance from the people addresses societies as patients: people controlled as puppets by therapeutic-like knowledge, using positive thoughts about the (so hoped) non-violent nature of society ("violence is anti-social") without regard to the "scientific" stigmatization reinforcement this position brings to marginalized populations. Morals is, in this perspective, what society says about itself, meaning what says those who know how to speak in public and have the time, the nerve and the support to avoid indifference or mockery or symbolic violence of the media.

Silent violent social movements, as it has been the Greek uprising started beginning at 2008 December, means that people do not know what they want, they behave irrationally and should be repressed, or they do not feel able to address society as an all, given the communicative, political and emotional confused situation one lives in?

In societies where everybody can vote since early in age and cannot influence the declining future perspectives for themselves and for the younger generations, what kind of democratic options are left? Both policemen and the people they are told to control, what can they tell us?

A recent study on ideology in Portugal found that, beside the dominant anti-ideological political centre melting pot, one can find four major trends: a) neo-liberal capitalism; b) state defensive protectionism; c) anti-corruption blame against state functioning; d) military blame against disorder (Dores, 2008). Is it the effect of the end-of-ideologies era or is it the result of a successful campaign to repress rational thinking out of rational action paradigm? Can one test this last hypothesis with the case of Greek uprising?

Managing fear of the future – a social secret

The position of the State is very different from what it was few years ago when, for the southern European countries, the integration at EU was an hope in itself: a) private control of violence

¹⁰ The suspicions about the undercover police violence rising intervention in the riots and afterwards, provoking a public sense of irrational out of control of the people's understanding behavior, if it happened, just confirms the idea that, this time, no manipulation of people's collective action did work.

has been developed, both within police fields of action as well as in the army fields of action; b) professional reforms both in police and army forces has been developed, changing the way security personnel and services deal with each other and deal with their targets and the public; c) social control culture developed in the process is very different from what it was before, cf. Christie (2000), Garland (2001); d) a different juridical framework in the criminal sphere Cf. Wacquant (2000) and Brandariz (2007), the doctrinal sphere cf. Jakobs (2003) and the political sphere cf. Osborne (2008/2007).

These modernization trends do not feet with common sense morals and provoke fear. They develop supported by fearful media crime exploring campaigns, under strong emotional manipulative political public discussions about punitive behaviors.

Goodwin and others (2001:4) explain some of the consequences of this trend: “most of all, the actual stuff of politics – moral principles, avowed goals, processes of mobilization, strategizing, the pleasures of participation – was absent” from sociology, as well. The main scientific disciplinary division occult emotions flux through society and, at the same time, occult the way politics are done. “Management is management. (...) Managing a social movement is not different from managing a bank because we are all in it, whatever it is, to pursue self-interest. (...) Even entire organizations that were founded to proselytize or to do good works can legitimacy abandon their missions if it seems rational to do so. (...). Rather than pondering this trend, most social scientists have taken it at face value. They increasingly treat people as self-interested, rational, and calculating” cf. Frank Dubin 2001:76-77.

Politics is special way to manipulate emotions and mainstream sociology represents it – both in the State and out of the State, as NGO – as a rational behavior, opposing it to spontaneous social movements, accepting and supporting, as such, the specialization (and segregation) of public sphere, in the frame of global process of privatization (cf. Osborne, 2008/07). That is why the Greek events do not have any easy social conceptual frame to address to. The common sociological sense for social movement requires an explicit intention of changing the way of institutional social management, which was not present.

The mainstream sociological methodology target the speeches and writing documents of people in charge, both in state or private institutions, looking for rationality as opposed to inorganic social movements presumed irrational (and irrelevant?) if there is no one taking its representation.¹¹ The same problem, in the political sphere, is well know from the participants at the World Social Fora, where no one is authorize to represent the movement of movements and where there are strong pressing to the definition of a common line of behavior in order to overcome and defeat the neo-liberal common enemy. The question is: if one does not access the representative speech of a social entity does it mean that there is no real social entity? Does it mean such a speechless entity does not matter? Or does it mean there is in place a political-media caching polity against political change out of control of dominant people? What is the positioning of sociology and sociologists about it?

Suppose protesters do not want to be judged by a mono paradigmatic social opinion and so they just communicate by email, internet chats, sms and friendly small groups. They do not care to prepare talking to the mass media. Marginal political activists are looking for marginal ways of expression since Greece becomes a democratic country, using local fanzines and news paper, websites and ritual demonstrations, graffiti and provoking policemen. The new comers' high

¹¹ As Alain Touraine and others notice long ago, when sociologists choose not to support social movements, they easily miss understand them and the ways social change occurs.

middle class youngsters marginal (for a while) activists used these already formatted ways of expressing themselves away from mainstream communication modes. Marginal cultural activists too, they felt new inspiration to create out of the mainstream closed auto-exclusive centre of society. Other marginal political activists did join the movement. All of them got stoked, for the moment. They just knew each other for the first time. “I saw society (solidarity) for the first time in my life” – said a young mother of youngsters of the same age of the killed person. All meetings they developed ended blocked without conclusions.

Disciplinary approaches emphasize the lack of authority to legitimate the use of force by the State institutions. Yes: this time the victim was a child of the ruler class. *Futurable* approaches emphasize the lack of confidence in the future and the social need to build something that satisfies this social need. *Modernizing* approaches fear that both other approaches are not in favor of the actual planned global trends.

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