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The Brain, the Face and Emotion (1)

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Entering a prison is a disagreeable and disturbing experience, but for all those visitors and educators who can bear it, this can be the price to be paid for a reward that is difficult to come by anywhere else: the privilege of witnessing the emergence of individuals out of human beings often reduced to mere numbers. An added bonus for the visitor is the affirmation of the value of one's own existence by satisfying the basic need of making human connections, particularly rewarding in this case as it involves those who are so forcefully and woefully isolated.

Prisoners, like guards and police officers, are stigmatized by their *ontological actualization* (2) of social constructs, tainted by the double stain of ignorance and despair. These groups are inevitably stereotyped by the preconceptions of the observer, such stereotypes being used by the powers that be to divide and rule (Dores, 2013). This is a similar situation to how African and Asian people may appear, to many Europeans, to all look alike, not because they are, but because their behavioral patterns are not well known; the unfamiliarity of Western observers with cultural decoding does not help in terms of non-verbal communication.

It is true that human beings are significantly more alike each other than any other known species. At the same time, the human versatility of *ontological actualization*, of expression and of embodiment is without equal, rendering each of us clearly distinct from all others to the experienced observer.

The prisoner's face is an inaccessible face, inscrutable and distressing, an echo of the hell imposed on the person (Zimbardo, 2007). We are shamed by it (look the other way), and are frightened by (tending to be paralyzed when confronted with) a social environment that imposes such a state of affairs; two prerequisites for the establishment of taboos. Personally, in the eagerness of discovery, I identified with the very faces that shamed me (Dores, 2004), and resisted the fear of the repression which inevitably befalls those who denounce that hellish system (Preto, 2010). I did, and continue do it at a distance – a distance which I hope will shorten between those who condemn, the condemned, and those who permit the dehumanization of a sector of society turned scapegoat. This task lends itself to the program of transformative justice (AAVV, 2013). Science, truth and the general wellbeing will benefit if there are conditions in society for all of us to look each other in the eyes. This is the scientific-political-juridical project to which I have dedicated myself.

A postgraduate course on the Facial Expression of Emotion offers me the opportunity to reflect on the role of the study of the face in the context of the reformulation of the social sciences over the next few decades. Such reformulation needs to take place, I surmise, if we bear in mind that: a) our humanity is the result of the evolution of life on Earth; b) the compartmentalization of the sciences for practical purposes must not lose sight of the factual integrity of nature; c) the Cartesian scission between religion and science must continue to be mended by the integration of the social sciences in the sphere of the other sciences; d) the fact that this task requires the determination and courage to extricate the search for knowledge from the stranglehold of political and other extraneous interests.

The Face as Taboo

What might be the defining characteristic of humans as a species: is it the size of the brain, the opposable thumbs, being born in such a helpless state of development, the permanent sexual readiness of the human female, or might it be the exaggerated mimicry which makes of us such social beings and creatures of habit? And what might be the principal characteristic emerging from these particularities: intelligence; the capacity to communicate, to laugh, to be aggressive, to feel shame, to be perverse, to project oneself backward and forward in time (recursiveness), to organize, to be artistic, or to be industrious?

The human face is only one among the many characteristics that distinguish humans from other forms of life. With globalization, it is common knowledge how, to many, the faces of individuals from other ethnic groups all seem alike. Our mind does not register information for which it is not primed; by the contrary, it projects onto those "others" an innate darkness we so diligently hide from ourselves.

The particular features of unfamiliar ethnicities, as the expressions of other animals or plants, escape us through ignorance; through the lack of familiarity and emotionally invested attention – permitting preconceptions and prejudices to flourish.

The scientific study of the face confronts, therefore, some evident epistemological obstacles in the limits of our senses and emotional competencies – it confronts epistemological obstacles in the will and availability (or lack thereof) of each individual, and of society, to invest in the observation of peoples' behaviors,

of which facial expressions are part. People have proven themselves capable of developing very powerful instruments of observation beyond their physical sensory capacities; yet, if the availability to do so is lacking, even atrocities as repugnant as the sexual abuse of children and domestic violence can go unrecognized as such; including by the victims, the abusers, their respective social and family circles, and to local institutions and authorities (3). On those occasions, in face of the inaccuracy of human sensory perception, we clamor for scientific formulas to establish the truth, with certainty; great expectations, but unlikely to be realistic.

Will there be the scientific will to study the face? Will we have the courage to look our oppressors in the eye, our governors, the disenfranchised, the condemned – especially when they are our family and friends or we know them to be innocent? Will we have the courage to scrutinize the perversity in the facial expressions of those abusers by whom we ourselves have been victimized? Will we allow our faces to be scrutinized to uncover our own darkness?

The answer at the moment is definitely no. The study of the face is taboo. The determination to initiate a scientific process as the one that the authors of this book have undertaken demonstrates the sort of courageous scientific action which deserves to be supported. What the results might be is impossible to predict.

My point of departure is social theory, as it presents itself to sociologists today. I begin by verifying the existence of a sociological taboo in the treatment of the human face, to then establish practical proposals to overcome the epistemological

obstacles, so as to give sociological meaning to the work of facial analysis by the students.

The Scientific Reinforcement of the Taboo

My discovery of the taboo surrounding the observation of the face began with my own feelings of shame and fear in studying people in prison. From there arose my hypothesis that, in the prisons, one finds, in an acute, stylized and extreme form, all the different postures that humans can assume in the face of the phenomenon of power: the "*spirit of prohibition*", the "*spirit of submission*" and the "*marginal spirit*" (Dores 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). I am not referring to explicit attitudes. "*States of spirit*", as a proposed sociological concept, refers to an individual's homeostatic organizational strategies of body-mind posture in the face of specific circumstances – methods of mobilizing practiced skills and Bourdieu's *habitus*. The concept does not refer to conventions of expression to communicate intentions, but rather intentions in action – even before they can become self-conscious and, possibly, thwarted by one's own will (or the will of others, in the case of sanctions or repression). We are not speaking of asking respondents for a reaction to a questionnaire from which we may then infer specific attitudes, but of identifying the spectrum of *ontological actualizations,* socially produced and reproduced, as directions of common social action.

The point is not to ask people to confess their feelings, but to find methods of scientifically observing emotions instilled by social forces, before volition can intervene and correct the associated *ontological actualization* processes. Nor is the point to register the expressive enactment of the emotions which

accompany the processes of *ontological actualization* and *embodiment*, but rather to understand and classify methods of managing self-agency.

The strong negative reaction to such a proposition on the part of some of my most respected colleagues made it obvious that I was confronting epistemological obstacles profoundly embedded in today's social theory. Seeing these barriers, filled me with an enthusiastic drive to comprehend the dimensions and complexity of such obstacles or system of obstacles – an ongoing undertaking that I fear not being able to complete in my lifetime, but one that certainly is exciting and useful for the future.

At the center of the taboo stands Descartes and his approach to science and religion. The dual provinces, shaped by modern shames and fears, of a) a metaphysical or mental domain for the religious studies, and b) an objective or corporeal domain for scientific studies, as organized by Descartes, divert scientists from considering mental phenomena as natural phenomena. The social sciences, by being mainly concerned with mental phenomena, are barred from integration in the sphere of the sciences: they work apart.

Thus sociology finds itself in the very delicate position of being between the worlds of the hard sciences and theology; between the explanations and the metaphors; between the formulated mathematical hypotheses and the phenomenological descriptions; between classifications and social morality. To escape being stuck between literature, theology, science and ideology, sociology must acknowledge that being a product both of the mind and the body, of emotions and feelings, of the subjective and the objective, is not a weakness but a strength. Instead of seeking refuge in the social sciences, in an incestuous

process described by Lahire (2012), sociology should promote its epistemological openness to the life and normative sciences – which, in any case, is already happening at the margins (Bateson, 1987; Prigogine, 1996; Goleman, 1999; or Damásio, 1994, for example).

The discomfort of sociologists when confronted with the *state of spirit* and the possibility of an entry into the world of the mind, can be compared to the shock of the members of an isolated tribe faced with the prospect of marrying individuals from a newly-discovered broader world, or of manumitted slaves longing for a lost sense of security.

Certainly, the period of profound transformation Europeans are living through in this second decade of the 21st century – as the shame and fear that paralyze us as victims of abusive regimes are overcome – can create the conditions for a reorganization of science capable of favoring new scientific paradigms, more integrated and productive. There are many authors working in that direction. The study of the face can only be understood as mediation between the mind and the body, the exterior and the interior, the society and the individual; it arises as one of the bridges between the old and the new epistemologies of the sciences, which will enable the social sciences to come out of the closet. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction that I associate myself with this book, within the framework of an international postgraduate course on the facial expression of emotion (4).

The Closet From Where Another Social Theory Will Emerge

The external limits, the taboos of social theory are a) the normative and moral debates – involving violence and personal lives – sublimated in ideologies or in normative systems (as the political systems or the courts), of which sociology pretends to be oblivious (as if it were possible); and b) the irrational, instinctive practices, inherent to our animal nature, whose taboo is guarded by the ghost of biologism, where only healthcare professionals and psychologists, with their established limitations, can enter. Said taboos constitute a necessary attempt to limit the social to a specific level of reality, above the biological and below the ideological, on which sociologists can focus and specialize: in that function taboos are useful and to be recommended. The problem is the epistemological insularity forced from such a level of reality, as if to claim a stretch of river, thinking it is always the same water, and the same fish inhabiting it. What is needed is to define and observe society in the context of the many levels of reality and fluency of people's everyday lives, of biological, mental and ecological human life.

Giddens (1985) proposed to substitute the classical social dimensions (politics, economy, status and culture) with others better adapted to studying the realities of advanced capitalist societies: capitalism, industrialism, belligerence and securitism. He also proposed to open the study of intimacy (Giddens, 1995). Yet, despite the author's prestige, his proposals were not followed. This can be seen as the presence of the actual limits of social theory; limits that can be illustrated by the innate violence concealed by bourgeois ideology (Hirshman, 1997), and the

personal struggle for survival or, as biologists call it, the biological imperative.

For Mouzelis (1995:7), the reification of and the reductionism inherent to Parsons' structural-functionalism were critiqued in the 70's, but were not overcome as a problem, in spite of the Parsonian language having been abandoned. The best and most cited authors of social theory of the post-war era, writes the Anglo-Greek sociologist, avoided the formulas but persisted in epistemological concepts with the same fundamental problems: anthropomorphic definitions of society (as is so often done with deities) and oversimplified stylizing of the complexity of the existence of life and of the human species.

Table 1. Limits of social theory.

	Upper Limits	Lower limits
Giddens	Violence	Intimacy
	Normative Debates	Biological Imperative
Mouzelis	Reification	Reductionism
	Theodicy	Evolution
Descartes	Idea of Perfection	Thought

The cognitive limitations arising from the current situation can be observed in the technocratic tendencies prevalent in the social sciences; above all evident in economics, where the econometric models for the treatment of official data, and the neoclassic theories dominant in the universities, have become the scientific support for pushing through ruinous policies over the past few decades. The urgency of the correction of a variable – the state deficit, for example – which preoccupies a sub-

discipline (public finance) of a discipline (economics), taken as essence of a depoliticized wisdom as "magic thinking" (i.e. the ready acceptance that "there's no alternative"), permits the abstraction of societies and environment, and covers up the violation of the moral values as well as the violence thereby provoked, all in the name of the science thus abused.

Conditioned by this epistemological state of the sciences, instead of considering people as eminently social beings, social theory has reduced each human being to an individual statistically indentified in some particular dimension, be it psychological, anthropological, geographic, economic, cultural, political, or something else. If the individual is about to be born or to die, is sick or in extremis, depressed or enthusiastic, fallen into vice or an example of good living, is the same – all that is beyond the actual focus of social theory, centered in "normality". In reality and in short, rather than normality, we experience the violence taboo and the study of the human face taboo as a process of reductionist and reified normalization directed by social theory.

Sociology's self-imposed limits, in its present state of evolution, are narrow. Its rules are neither legal nor natural; neither doctrinal nor set through individual volition; neither inductive nor experimental; neither theological nor ideological; nor are they positive in their effect. There are no sensory instruments capable of capturing social reality – which is why there are those, like Mrs. Thatcher (accompanied by some sociologists), who say that society does not exist. That is the logical risk of the social sciences presenting themselves as outside the sciences, and, therefore, as per the Cartesian tradition,

a realm of beliefs; mere ideas – "ideal types", as Max Weber would say.

These limits are embodied by sociologists in an affective and negative manner when they learn to despise positivism and biologism. The just denunciations – as the insensitivity of positivism to political ideologies or the evolutionist justifications for ethnic discrimination – must know how to distinguish the baby from the bathwater. Also, structural-functionalism needs to be well understood by sociologists to separate the wheat from the chaff. Running the risk of repeating the same mistakes it thinks it has overcome (Mouzelis, 1995), social theory suffers from ills (such as ethnocentrism and classificatory validation of stigmas, for example) which it should be capable of identifying and correcting. It must also be willing to get back to Comte, when he aspired to a sociology integrated in a scientific world without separate social sciences (getting rid of the megalomania of sociology constituting a synthesis of all the scientific knowledge). It must also accept society as a concept to be used in a broad manner – at the chemical, cellular, physical, the human mind and other animal species levels (Bateson, 1987; Goleman, 1999; or Damásio, 2003).

There are also methodological precepts which reinforce the taboo effect, turning the sociologists, and the social sciences, insensitive to certain realities. For example, the tenet of distancing oneself from the subject of one's research and the way it is taught and learned in the universities. The scientific distancing is a reference to the primacy of the theoretical function within the methodological processes of observation, recording and interpretation of information. It is important not to confuse the concepts with the realities they seek to reflect, and criticize

both, using one against the other. Nevertheless, being that in the early stages of learning the students do not have any theoretical alternatives clear in their minds, nor the necessity of considering options at that level, the professors of methods can be tempted to explain distancing using metaphors: conceptual distancing is substituted by geographical or emotional distancing. Thus, given the lack of critical preparation of the students, they easily fall under the effect of cultural preconceptions towards the people they study; people for whom they do not feel sufficient empathy to be able to defend (as equals) or comprehend. The problem is fundamental, as empathy is essential to discover the humanity that, regardless of anything else, exists in all of us.

In reality, the reproduction of ethnocentrism and scientific reinforcement of social stigmas, regardless of the critical discourse of some of the better prepared, are commonplace, tolerated, or even stimulated among sociologists. This is reflected in the profound ignorance concerning the law, which is seen as a discipline foreign to sociology – as if human rights and humanity were not the moral horizon of sociology.

As stated above, the methodological limits of sociology, in its present state of evolution, are narrow. What is called data, either quantitative or qualitative, superficial or in depth, macro or micro, or even interdisciplinary, is regularly reductionist (without any relationship established between the different levels of reality). It is tendentiously interpreted in a reified manner, capable of adding meaning to the epistemological lacunas imposed on sociological work.

In the last few decades, instead of turning outward looking for realities to be discovered, the social sciences turned inward, divided into a myriad disciplines, in turn divided into

sub-disciplines, very often ignorant of each other (Lahire, 2012). In these cognitive tracks it becomes difficult to reconcile the descriptions with the explanations, the former favored by the anthropologists and the latter by sociologists.

Capitalist individualism can be an epistemological obstacle to "seeing" society; thus, certain individuals think of social solidarity and the people, as strange or nonexistent subjects. The competition, the alienated character, the modern division of labor, all can impose themselves on the conscience of whoever may be obsessed with the labor market and thereby forget himself to be a living being, beneficiary of the rights inherited from past social struggles. To Holloway (2003), the capitalist system tends to incapacitate each person, within their professional sphere; preventing them from understanding, and from looking for the conditions to understand, the production, cultural and political systems as a whole. That understanding is unilaterally reserved for those who benefit from the privilege of time and access to information at the superior level (meta-information, sometimes taught at the universities, and above all guarded as state or industrial secrets).

At the same time, as Durkeim (1960) described, organic solidarity, the modern society, organized in this individualist manner, turns each person more dependent on the whole of humanity. Society is denser and more present in the everyday life of each person than ever before, as shows the experience of globalization and the planetary effects of so many events since the "Age of Discovery" (5). Science itself, as reality and promise, is one of the results of that society to which we aspire and call humanity.

With the development of computer technology – along with growing socioeconomic inequalities and wars, financial crises and longstanding practices of exploitation of the most vulnerable, the use of violence, as well as strategies of debt imposition – the Internet was developed, connecting businesses and activists across the globe, as everything that becomes known is exposed and discussed in economic and social forums. The social consequences of these dynamics being most recently evident in the transformative protests in North Africa, Southern Europe, USA, Turkey, Brazil, and so on, with yet so much to be seen (Castells, 2012).

In periods of such profound transformation, social theory can reengage with the classical problems of sociology. Are the social sciences adaptive sciences which produce metaphors, archetypes, rather than positive concepts? Should society be thought of as a thing, distinct from the people who compose it, or as a set of meanings attributed to people´s actions within relational webs? Should sociology accept the study of attitudes – sociologists' interpretations of what might be the meaning of the formal responses and behaviors of those they study – or might it dare to consider concepts such as *states of spirit* – unstable forms of *ontological actualization* and of expression of personal and social forms of homeostasis – with classical types such as the *capitalist spirit*, the *revolutionary spirit*, and the *collective conscious*?

If the existence of human society is recognized, it must *per force* leave traces in the processes of *ontological actualization*, in the same way that the experience of living directly affects genetic transformation. *Ontological actualization* – the presence of inheritances of the past, from inside out – and

embodiment – the signaling of possible futures, from outside in – meet in the present: in different forms of expression, particularly on the face, where, beyond an individual's personal traits, characteristics of ethnicity, gender, culture, nationality, professional occupation, and, more generally, social status can be easily highlighted. Sociological methods can and should open themselves to the study of new data developed by other sciences, with the potential of materializing concepts until now only imagined (as atoms could only be postulated through many centuries, up to the invention of the electron microscope). For example, data can be collected by such methods as, imaging (magnetic resonance and tomography by emission of positrons); neurophysiology (spontaneous electroencephalogram online and electromyogram); audiology (6); hormonal manipulation (neurotransmitters and neurotransmitter assay) with serotonin, adrenalin, acetylcholine, dopamine, endorphin, GABA. The identification of emotions through the study of the face, as well as other data gathering techniques, can help science to discover more precise and objective outlines of what may be *states of spirit,* not as metaphors, but as scientifically demonstrable facts.

Will the detailed study of the face, as an example of *ontological actualization* and expression of the interface between individual and society be worthwhile? Will it be possible to undertake such work without accepting to develop social theory as a scientific theory like the others, free of inferiority complexes? Will it be possible to advance in this discovery without taking into account the knowledge and methods of biology, of the health sciences, or ideologies and the law? Of course there is no way to predict what the future will bring should the study of the face take hold, as I believe will.

In Support of an Actualization of Social Theory

Today people typically introduce themselves by declaring their profession. But, at least in non-verbal terms, they also share other types of mutual recognition – empathy, sympathy and mimicry.

The fact of the non-verbal communication not being registered by recording methods has limited sociological analysis, as cites Collins (2008) in reference to his study of violence through the viewing of video surveillance tapes. However, observation is often employed in anthropology. The novelty of what is being suggested does not lie in the methodological apparatus but rather in the consideration of violence as a conceptual problem. Latour (2007) also notes how sociology limits itself to studying the relations between two or more people while radically ignoring the social construction of highly technological environments through which social interactions intensify. Tarde (1993) (an author of great success and prestige in life, but without followers in the most recent developments in social theory) suggested the existence of an innate tendency to mimic the behavior of others. Today we know this tendency to be effected by the great quantities of fusional cells that characterize the human species.

The selective choices of the social sciences, in fragmenting themselves, and of the social theories, in isolating themselves, tend to truncate reality. They do it through the concepts, the methods, and the emotional conditioning incorporated in the professionals.

The face constitutes a privileged and complex mediator between the practices and the inner-self of each human being within different environments. Social and individual intentions are produced in the bodies of the each human being. Individual and social worlds that are at the same time integrated between themselves and passing through distinct levels, characterized by distinct spaces/time – public, institutional or intimate, for example. The perception of what might be inside or outside is the focus of immemorial social and personal disputes concerning satisfaction and power, capacities and ingenuity, dispositions and *ontological actualizations*. Perception that is also the center of boundaries and taboos between religion and science, instincts and education, genders and generations, between the basic necessities and the seeking of the meaning of life. How do we deal with that?

Damásio (1994) became famous for embarking in the research of conscience, arguing it to belong to the body (rather than the soul or the brain). A body without mind is a corpse. On the other hand, conscience has its own and powerful influence on the *ontological actualization* in each person, just as experience can have effects at the genetic level. That influence increases with the intensity of the experience and the degree of power enjoyed. To the point that education, habits, and training are able to alter the innate – of which the successive sports records or expanding cognitive (and social) capabilities are practical demonstration.

Facial expressions, in the same way as violence or *states-of-spirit*, are particularly unstable and demand specialized studies articulated between various sciences, such as biology, neurology,

or law. The absence of the study of the face reveals the conservatism of the dominant social theory.

The actualization of national sociologies, in the globalization era, should seek to discover in any person, any society and any culture whatever there may be of coherent and common with all others – genetic inheritance – and that which makes them singular at each moment. The *revolutionary spirit*, for example, to some is hope, to others threat. Might that *spirit* be inherent to human nature, at any time and in any place; is it particular to the Revolutionary Era (Hobsbawm, 2009); or does it arise from the globalization process?

"Already by the time of the French Revolution, Wallerstein notes, there was a single world market, and increasingly a single world political system as well, dominated by the huge colonial empires. As a result, the storming of the Bastille in Paris could well end up having effects on Denmark, or even Egypt, just as profound as on France itself—in some cases, even more so. Hence he speaks of the ´world revolution of 1789´, followed by the ´world revolution of 1848´, which saw revolutions break out almost simultaneously in fifty countries, from Wallachia to Brazil. In no case did the revolutionaries succeed in taking power, but afterward, institutions inspired by the French Revolution—notably, universal systems of primary education—were put in place pretty much everywhere. Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world revolution ultimately responsible for the New Deal and European welfare states as much as for Soviet communism. The last in the series was the world revolution of 1968—which, much like 1848, broke out almost everywhere, from China to Mexico, seized power nowhere, but nonetheless changed everything. This was a

revolution against state bureaucracies, and for the inseparability of personal and political liberation, whose most lasting legacy will likely be the birth of modern feminism.

Revolutions are thus planetary phenomena (…)" (Graeber, 2013).

In this extended citation, the author avails himself of the prestige of Emanuel Wallerstein to note how globalization is not a recent phenomenon – although it assumes new forms, made possible by the existence of new globalized and cheap cognitive infrastructures (Castels, 2004). Graeber, it should be noted, refers to the mystery of the practical and future effects of the various revolutions, not only in the areas around the events, but also very far from where they happened, in the heart of very different cultures, whose knowledge of each other is limited even today. How to objectively explain the telepathy – let us call it that – through which the *revolutionary spirit* transforms and translates itself throughout time and space? Or how to explain the expansion of the *capitalist spirit*, described by Max Weber (2005), resulting from the secularization of one version of Calvinist faith? How to explain the conjugation of the different individual consciences – associated to the homeostatic processes of each body – into diverse and mutable collective-intelligences, which Durkheim (1960) called societies?

Why is it that such transmissions are still a mystery if the transmission of laughter in society is a widely experienced and enjoyed phenomenon? Why has sociology not yet determined what is happening in the sports' arenas, and music or religious events? How is the pleasure of the communion of emotions and feelings (not always positive) produced? Why is it that the specialized study of social movements, in spite of the efforts of

theorists like Alberoni (1989), did not question itself as to the biological foundations of the processes of transmission of emotions, sentiments and behaviors?

Had sociology heeded Giddens' (1985) suggestion and abandoned the old analytical parameters (politics, economy, status, and culture), or at least had it started to also consider the more current social dimensions (capitalism, industrialism, militarism and securitism), perhaps it would have been possible to adopt more comprehensive and applicable concepts, such as Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus* (1979) – dependent upon the comprehension of the phenomena of the transmission of *dispositions* both between and intra generations. These phenomena happen through conflict, that is, through selective reinforcements and repressions, that can be spontaneous, but can also be conditioned by the state machinery, including military, nationalist and religious (7) ideologies, the police, the courts, prisons, and the scientific apparatus.

The mimicry proposed by Gabriel Tarde (1993), opened previously unexpected paths for the understanding of the emotion-, sentiment- and behavior-transmission processes, not only by revolutionary, economic or religious avenues, but also, in the fabric of social relations, through the most intimate human interactions, as understood by Giddens (1985). Between the most individualistic everyday life and the public life, there is a difference of intensity and level of *embodiment*; yet, there are no differences between the needs for *ontological actualization*: people go home to rest, meet family but also live outside, in the public world, and think of what they are going to do the following day. Any given social experience is lived more or less

consciously, and it becomes more or less assimilated, according the particular development of each individual.

Children, like the majority of the revolutionaries or those in love, do not let themselves be led by reason. They spontaneously follow, on the one hand, their emotions – according to Damásio's definition (1994), in the sense of homeostatic signals concerning the conditions of well-being or ill-being, generalized or localized, which are a condition of existence – and on the other, those on whom they model their behavior: the charismatic people to whom they paid most attention. Through them, or through their more local representatives, they absorb the reinforcements or the punishments associated with each gesture in each situation: positive and/or negative feelings of satisfaction and/or pain.

Each person, in the same way as groups and societies, evolves in life experimenting with intertwined processes of *embodiment* and *ontological actualization*, as two more senses, beyond the basic five. All these senses are managed by the same homeostatic process that gives resilience to our lives. Social theory could define society as a high-level homeostatic process, integrating mimetic processes in progress, beyond the psychological controls available to each individual, and independently of higher level environmental homeostatic processes. These, according to the *habitus* theory, spontaneous *ontological actualization* processes, as well as processes of embodiment conducted institutionally through mechanisms of power, are both implicated at the level of facial expression, and therefore measurable.

Normality, war, revolution and social struggles refer to situations typified by varying intensities of different mimetic and

social transmission of emotions, sentiments and behaviors. When institutional regulation is predominant, the public discussion is of normality or war depending on whether or not there is respect for the courts and the law. When spontaneous regulation is predominant, revolution or social struggle are discussed, depending on whether the legal system in effect is new or old.

Values, Epistemes, and Social Transformation

Professional sociology has become a sort of cognitive cathedral, with a mysterious void as the principal nave, produced by thou-shalt-nots as the above discussed, and small, specialized lateral chapels, generally futilely critical of the different ways in which the mysteries of sociology persist.

Going into the study of sociology, the challenge is knowing what its practical application might be. The best answer might be to carry out surveys or interviews. Perhaps, for the most daring, data interpretation. And for the most competent and informed, to interpret the present social history. With professionalization comes time for specialization, be it in the functioning of a type of institution, or in an aspect of social life. Whatever the case, exotic epistemological doubts are left behind.

When the question is posed of what the purpose of sociology might be, the specter of its abolition arises – resulting from a scientific evaluation of its social value. However, what is immediately evident is the need that many other activities and sciences have for a better understanding of what society is – that mystery, with strong or weak impacts on people, according to the

occasion, be it depressing or exciting, favorable or not, a little like the unstable moods of the old animistic deities.

Damásio (2010), studying mental conditions, discovered the importance of social emotions and called for the collaboration of those sciences most apt to an understanding of the social. Architects, of exteriors or interiors, refer to the characteristics of the societies for which they wish to work as a decisive part of their design options, including the necessity of the societies participating in the architectural design. Computer science seeks to understand human intelligence, including social intelligence, to develop its products. The health sciences need to know how to organize themselves, in institutional terms; how to approach the patients, and their respective socially classifiable living conditions; and how placebos, magic, affection and society cure and produce diseases. The law needs to know the social base from which its doctrines evolve. Psychologists cannot help but notice how people are affected by society and behave in a predictable manner in light of that dynamic. Which is to say: even if sociology were abolished, as being useless or because society was not deemed to exist, immediately innumerable necessities would arise calling for some school of knowledge capable of bridging the evident lacunas.

Society does exist: if it did not, it would have to be invented. Social theory occupies an essential cognitive space, but, like an inexperienced lifeguard, it permitted itself to be latched onto by the drowning man of "perfect" society – the ideal model to which, hopefully, all other societies should be converging: the consumer society, promoter of win-win games that work for everyone, except for the natural environment (Beck, 1992), and those who have lost their capacity to compete

by not being sufficiently fit (excluded, in reality: see Young, 1999).

The sociological bias against positivism and biologism, private insults between sociologists, as well as against Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, Tarde and others, can be understood as integral parts of sociology's process of self-denial, as well as of its own sources of classical cognitive organization; not to be understood as open debate, but as social construct of taboos, which it is important not only to resist to but also to counteract.

The ongoing neoliberal project of social transformation, demands an end to the politics of resistance on the part of social theory; as discussed above, a social theory that is closed upon itself and divided in subdisciplines, in what is an unproductive cognitive process (Lahire, 2012). There is a need to retake social sciences' path of concretization of scientific aspiration, making them sciences like all others and opening them to positive knowledge. Yes, society exists: let us prove it, as physics proved the existence of gravity and atoms, even if the exact formulations of how they exist evolve through the continuing questioning of the precise contours of their existence. Therefore, there is no reason to imagine that society is particular to humans, as legs and hair, nails and liver, also are not. Society is a concept referring to facts, things, varied phenomena, from the cooperation between bees or between brain cells, for example, to the degree of compactness of inert materials, like sandstone or granite. Phenomena that also pass through the more or less parasitical symbioses, permanently at risk of instability, like the processes of pleasure and pain, bond/victimization/abuse, of which there are abundant examples in nature, such as the tremendous diversity of sexual practices.

Society Without Faces?

There is no sociological specialty, nor subdiscipline, for the study of the face. In spite of there being sociologists of the body and of the emotions, no sociologist believes herself to be competent to study the human face, being barred from doing so by the epistemological limitations we have been discussing. The micro-social and the macro-social, the bodies and the minds, are, theoretically, mutually incompatible and incommunicable. They do not permit interfaces: there is no place for the face. The interior of the individual is, in principle, unreachable by other individuals and even by the very person invested in discovering himself. In general terms, the sociological subjects are external to all others, as the social movements are in relation to institutions: the work sealed off to thought; the qualities indifferent to the quantities; the theory separate from the methods; the subject independent of the object; the emotions unrelated to reason, and the mind apart from the body. The god-ideal and earth-idea continue in their Cartesian rift and dilute themselves in myriad concretizations, including the image we have of ourselves: individuals, independent of the social, and even of ourselves – that is, each level of reality is thought of as a complete reality; autonomous and competing with all others.

What the law consecrated as a formula to clarify the truth, the face-to-face, the curtailing of distances, the empathic confrontation, is not admitted in the mainstream methods of the social sciences.

If society is an aggregate of individuals, or a web of interpersonal relations, or the confluence of distinct dimensions

of social life, what is the place of the face? The face is in a no-man's-land, between psychology that studies our inner life, and sociology that studies our external one; between the micro social interactions and the macro social relations; between the subjective and the objective. The nerve center of our senses and the front of all public presentations is as hidden from science as our most private parts, delegated to sexology.

Is it not extraordinary that the face is not part of the discussion, even though it is through it that most of the communication between subjects and researchers takes place? Should the knowledge of the face be left to commonsense? Is the face transparent, socially irrelevant, or, by the contrary, is it where the struggles of the education of balance between spontaneity and institutional behavior most intensely occur – in theater and cinema, in politics and the courts, in love and complicity? Where and how are "natural" emotions (innate in each moment), and wants "artificially" induced from the exterior, expressed? Is it not on the face that human nature principally mixes with reality through the homeostatic system? Is the face not the material expression closest to the homeostatic system?

The face is, precisely, the place where subjectivity takes physical form; where empathy is concretized; where the eyes always first focus, as acknowledgement, looking for all identities (kinship, ethnicity, class, gender, age group, tastes, etc.). The face is where the soul materializes; where the body volatizes and both auto-regulate in homeostasis – in expressions of well-being or ill-being: sincere, disguised or repressed.

The face, any face, boldly presents itself as criticism to the actual closing of social theory in an epistemological closet, divided into dimensions, disciplines and subdisciplines on

parallel tracks – that is, without ever meeting. On the face everything meets, and everything makes sense, even if science has not yet managed to feel at ease with such an object.

It is not yet known how, but each one of us adopts tactical criteria to deal with the many faces with which we are confronted every day. Science requires a deconstruction of said criteria, in a mechanical and classificatory manner, or in a dialectical or quantum manner.

It was in that spirit that the students of the course herein celebrated gave themselves to the trouble of going on the internet to discover three pictures of faces. First they selected a *state of spirit* from the three suggested by the professor: *spirit of prohibition* (established and usual), *spirit of submission* (strange but accepted) or *marginal spirit* (strange and contested), in accordance with the perceived impact of the power read on the facial expressions. The three faces to choose, from among the innumerable possibilities, should be all of the same type and, at the same time, different from each other, as per the following logic:

Table 2. Subtypes of states of spirit related to power.

	Powers in flux (to voice)	Effective powers (to do)	Expectations of power (to sense)
Spirit of prohibition	To order	To cooperate	To direct
Spirit of submission	Ideology	Subordination	Identity
Marginal spirit	Eccentric	Excluded	Revolutionary

This logic can be tacitly understood, but it was developed from a theoretic framework on what is power, which in brief states that social power arises, on the one hand, from the reproductive system of the species (favors patriarchy) and, on the

other hand, from the capacity to maximize empathy or social solidarity through communication (favors politicians). Its legitimacy stems from the minimization of feelings of injustice; from thinking that justice is being done in spite of the social inequities produced by patriarchy and the practice of politics.

The function of rearing offspring and the sexual division of labor place women at the rearguard of the battles to drive evolutionary potentialities undertaken principally by men. The functions of safeguarding, promulgating and enforcing respect for the taboos and the laws give rise to social power; which is subject to the privileges, rights and associated costs, relating to both the powerful and the rest of society. To the majority of human groups, and the majority of the time, befalls submission; that is, accepting/following the mission initiated/led by the most powerful – it being, of the three *states of spirit* we refer to, the most economical in terms of energy, and the least burdensome as to responsibility. The dissidents, mainly young males with no access to the social status of the dominants, nor to the respective reproductive resources, sexual or material, constitute the outcasts.

The extraordinarily articulate and complex capacity for communication developed by the human species, which leapt forward with the invention of writing, keeps on amazing us, from the invention of the printing-press to the ongoing information revolution. With its computer-based social networks, the Digital Age saw the creation of a virtual world, at the same time imaginary and materialized (in libraries and databanks), with conditional access. It is a separate world from other life, the life of those who *embody* the effects of the communications (and of the politics) but do not *ontologically actualize* in that virtual world (do not write or are not read). It is not only history that

relates the lives of the winners while presuming the predestination of the losers. It is our collective mind that ignores the existence of the majority of humanity and accepts as hyper-real the idealized types imaginatively developed in the virtual worlds. Thus, it is not surprising that we should have difficulty in finding ourselves, split as we are between our bodies and our social image as played out in the virtual world.

This capacity for developing a virtual world evolved from primitive life forms, incapable of self-reflection, until the imposition of the capacity/necessity of recursion inherent in people (Corballis, 2011, & Cooley, 1922). Unlike other animals, humans virtually unfold their mental capacity, as if between two facing mirrors infinitely reflecting existence – forward and backward, in time; above and below in space: future and past, spirituality and death. This is good and bad, as always – life's pleasures are paid with the conscience of death, and the anguish of future expectations.

The power capabilities presented in table 2 are specialized in considering time as past (the doing), present (the sensing), and the future (the voicing). The "doing" is the power of the completed work left in legacy, foundation of tradition; the power of the charismatic and reassuring presence, depends on the ability of developing what we call "sensing"; the power of suggestion, seduction and coordination is the "voicing" (or writing, or singing). Each human being is born existing, as a being capable of sensing – the present – and immediately begins to learn to talk and, gradually, to distinguish the voicing from the doing, the virtual from the real, the future from the past, the high and the low, until s/he becomes a political being.

The face is the public image of the individual, of each person's way of feeling, which is interpreted in the light of dominant social values. It reveals the human nature and the singular nature of the person, particularly through the character and the manner of talking and behaving, as it relates to age, gender, class, nationality, culture, political orientation, etc.

Starting with the tacit knowledge with which we commonly assess our interlocutors, and of some knowledge acquired in the course of learning how to identify traces of emotion on the face, the students were asked to choose photos from the internet capable of representing the three types of power of one of the three *states of spirit* under consideration. Out of the fourteen entries submitted, three students chose faces exhibiting the *spirit of prohibition*, four chose examples of the *spirit of submission*, and seven the *marginal spirit*.

Table 3. Figures chosen to illustrate the subtypes of *states-of-spirit* relating to power.

	Powers in flux (to voice)	Effective powers (to do)	Expectations of power (to sense)
Spirit of prohibition	John Paul II (Politician) Belmiro de Azevedo	John Paul II (Artist) Durão Barroso	John Paul II (Coach) Ban Ki Moon
Spirit of Submission	Prisoner (Catholic priest) Paying taxes (Child soldier saluting)	Soldier (sports cheerleader) Hearing his sentence being imposed (Upset child)	Religious (Elderly Muslim at prayer) Work office (Mother and daughter, very close)
Marginal spirit	José Manuel Coelho (Madeira) (Isaltino Morais) Salvador Dali (Lady Gaga) Actor playing Jesus (Maradona) Lawyer David Touger	Suu Kiy, Myanmar (Isaltino Morais) Lula da Silva (Mandela) Actor playing Jesus (Traficant Pablo Escobar Osama Bin Laden	Pussy Riot (Isaltino Morais) Fidel Castro (Marinho e Pinto) Actor playing Jesus (Hugo Chávez) Che Guevera

First note: We observe a disproportion in gender choices (3 women, 2 children, and 9 men out of 14). Second note: The representations of the *spirit of submission* contradict the dominant tendency to look for public figures (9 of 10 in the other cases).

Of all the 42 figures chosen, 15 are politicians, 9 are religious references, 7 are artists, 2 are businesspeople, 2 are individuals connected to sports, 2 are convicted criminals, 2 are individuals connected with war, and others. It is noted:

a) The *marginal spirit*: rebellious youth, revolutionary, charismatic, aristocratic, military, religious, bourgeois or working class; this was a more attractive choice than the power to prohibit;

b) Gender inequality is evident in the choices of representations of power;

c) The anonymous character of the figures selected for the *spirit of submission* expresses the link between that *spirit* and the existence of people who do not participate much in the virtual world. They are more akin to models of *embodiment*;

d) The emphasis on the religious, and above all on the politicians when thinking of power, and the ignoring of figures representative of large corporations, the military, the police and the courts.

In some cases, the students chose the same person (John Paul II, Isaltino Morais, Jesus played by an actor) to illustrate the different relations with power, through the voicing, the doing and the sensing. This calls our attention to the fact that each one of us

is able to *ontologically actualize* one of another *state of spirit*, throughout different periods of the day and of our lives even without knowing how to read or write.

The fact of each one of us spending most of the time *ontologically actualizing* certain *states of spirit*, molds our character through habit. This process transmits through mimesis (and orally) *states of spirit* generated in the virtual world – as is done by politics, science, entertainment and the arts. Public figures become known in certain functions, different from those they engage in with family and within their more intimate social networks. Their pictures represent models of *embodiment*, independently of their effective mimetic *ontological actualization* (charisma) and virtual *ontological actualization* (recording) capacities.

In the real world, as external from and preceding the virtual world, individuals are not confused with their social roles. We are recognizable for the differences in trajectory which make of each of us a singular human being, a singular trajectory so often reflected on the face. At the same time, we are capable of transforming ourselves, personally and socially, using the versatility unique to our species – though certainly with associated costs.

Social secrets – that is, a) the typically uncritical character of the most common *state of spirit*, *submission*; b) the instability of the character of each one, which reason and science attempt to reduce, setting in writing the "truth"; c) humanity´s self-destructive abuses historically developed by recursion, against the people and the natural environment; d) the shame felt (emotion arising when there is a risk of rupture with social bonds), namely when some power is exerted, by the exposing of

the irrationality and/or perversity of the words and/or of the actions; e) the spontaneous and institutionalized covering up of the truth – are a backdrop for facial expressions. Subtle and more or less ambiguous expressions that result from the shockwaves between the processes of *ontological actualization* and *embodiment*.

In short, the methodological distance asked by sociology, as a discipline, of its professionals makes people's faces and the expressive (and informative) wealth therein inaccessible, to the point of the study of the face possibly being perceived as scientifically obscene – as exposing one's privates to the public – because that reveals the actual limitations of our science. It is exactly for that reason that, from the viewpoint of knowledge, diving into the study of the face will be a source of far-reaching discoveries, akin to those of the Age of Discovery of the 15th and 16th Centuries – so that a new, centrifugal world may come to replace the current centripetal world of the social sciences.

Faces in Society and *Ontological Actualization*

"The judgment of a particular facial expression of emotion is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Such a process, which often is the immediate identification of a signal, involves complex variables, such as gender, age, emotional state and social context."
– A. Freitas-Magalhães, 2011.

Are there general characteristics of the facial expression of *states of spirit*? Does the immaterial regulatory screen of each human being's existence, which we term as homeostasis, have a

direct equivalence in facial expressions? Can it be that the states of spirit and the faces are expressions of homeostasis?

If the answer is yes, a proper definition of homeostasis must be worked out, which would come to have *spiritual* and material equivalence. It would be as if brain and social adjustment functions started and ended on the face and the *state of spirit* it expressed. Just as brain size or the opposable thumbs, the laugh, the perversity, cannot each account, on their own, for the special nature of the human life; it will not do to expect of the face that which it cannot give: the essence of humanity. Rather, the study of the face can contribute by offering a vantage point for the observation of homeostasis, where all aspects of each living being's existence are integrated at the same time: *ontological actualization*, *embodiment*, expression.

The works submitted by the students suggested several hypotheses of work, taking into account the very small samples and the capacity of observation of each student.

Table 4. Hypotheses of characteristics observed from selected facial expression of the *states of spirit.*

	characteristics of the facial expression of the states of spirit
Spirit of prohibition	Open eyes, flared nostrils, open mouth and raised eyebrows. Emotions: absence of joy, sadness and even disgust. Variations: forehead and eyes/body language is also important
Spirit of submission	Blank expression; eyebrows: horizontal
Marginal spirit	Facial asymmetry; eyes wide open and fixed on something; mouth firmly shut.

The gestures, the attire, the hairstyles and the accessories used are also important in the transmission of signals about the *state of spirit* of each one, as is the contrast or the harmony with

the surrounding environment. But observing just the face, can there be a distinctive expressional trait capable of characterizing the *spirit of submission* – an indeterminate gaze, as opposed to the wide-open eyes of the other *states of spirit* considered?

The concept of the *spirit of submission* sees it as an opportunity for energy savings. The brain can relax its attention and "not think", which is a very practical and useful function, as in the various stages of sleep. No one can be permanently thinking of their actions and respective associated concepts. By the contrary, humans are animals of habit; thus we compensate our natural tendency for recursion, of which the other animals are free. Even when fully awake, methods of relaxation, meditation and letting go without reflection are reinvigorating and much appreciated, in that they give flexibility to minds and bodies invested in physical and mental routines that can, at a minor slipup, degenerate to the disastrous.

The sociologist should not permit him/herself to be seduced by the moralistic Manichaeisms typical of conflict situations, opposing the *spirit of prohibition* to the *marginal spirit*. The charisma effect associated with conflict situations opposes the *spirit of prohibition* to the *spirit of submission.* Positions of power (to which, so often, the *spirit of prohibition* attaches itself) have a great deal of social weight, despite the abuses of power both in periods of social stability and social upheaval. In times of social transformation, such as those we are living through currently, the same charisma effect gradually becomes more favorable to the marginal positions (developed by those who demand more power for themselves, from positions of lesser power), bringing to the stage as many new opportunities as there are opportunists. The *spirit of submission* – that which

determines the stability of institutionalized power, or its instability in the face of challenges from the margins, as it submits, above all, to the prevailing institutions or the emergent challenges – is the gauge of the balance between the mimetic *status quo* and the climate of transformation.

Will it be possible, therefore, to find the facial characteristics of a body in the process of *ontologically materializing* each one of these states of spirit, independently of circumstances and the surrounding social environment? Will the face, as a point of scientific investigation, be immune to the effects of social seduction to which all sociologists are, by nature, instinctively more sensitive?

Embodiment and Social Emotions

Mass psychology, and its conceptual descendants, such as social movements or urban violence theories, arose as a form of registering and comprehending the proactive nature of the social sharing of emotions. The presumed irrationality of the masses (in contrast with the equally presumed rationality of decision making process informing individual common actions, which are often mimetic in nature) justifies the false independence of the normative contexts from the mass actions. As if the masses, the social movements, the violent actions were natural phenomena, like tornadoes, independent of their normative contexts. As if societies were a substance distinct from social phenomena like protest marches. As if the reproduction of society were something other than the transformation of society. As if psychology, violence and collective actions were antisocial. Are they?

When out of a peaceful demonstration appear violent groups, for example, is there a need to distinguish or associate the two developments? And in a war context, when there is an assault or an assassination attempt, should that be associated to the state of social agitation or should it be treated as a crime? And should crimes be treated as unrelated to society or as an integral part of the social fabric into which they are woven? Are the subordinates who obey illegitimate orders – e.g. voluntarily placing at risk the physical integrity of others – responsible for the crimes of which they were instruments, or does their situation as individuals constrained by oppressive systems exculpate them from any responsibility?

Eichman presented himself as a mere functionary of the III Reich and was condemned, but in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1991). Manning was arrested, allegedly tortured, and condemned for the offense of denouncing war crimes committed by the armed forces of his country, the USA, in Iraq. Edward Snowden is the focus of a global manhunt for having exposed Prism, and other surveillance programs, involving the global eavesdropping on communications, organized between Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and other private companies and the CIA.

Little is known, in sociological terms, about states of war and about violence. What is known is that the associations that may be made between the distinct elements (such as, between each person, their respective judgments and the social framework in which it all occurs) of each situation are not politically nor morally indifferent.

Collins observed how isolated individuals avoid violence, and how during outbreaks of social violence aggressors seek out victims among the most vulnerable (Collins, 2008/2013). It is

also known how committing abuses against third parties is associated with the degradation of the victims' image, imagined as "others", as sub-humans or even not human at all, as happened with colonized nations, slaves, some illegitimate children, homosexuals, adulteresses, etc. Through the Milgram experiment and the Stockholm syndrome it is known how subordination to a social pressure can turn a submissive individual into an instrument of extremely violent acts. Zimbardo's 1973 Stanford experiment showed how any person, even if politically informed and motivated, is incapable of resisting a perverse social context, such as a prison (Zimbardo, 2007).

In studying war, Gaston Bouthoul (1991/1961:426) describes the emotions involved: "derivation of guilt complex (…) contagious generalization of persecution complexes with base in pride and distrust (…) wanting to ignore guilty conscience (…)". On such emotions the law intervenes by generating and confirming expectations of justice. This happens through justice systems that, in turn, are often incapable of imposing the rule of law (Preto, 2010): law that can get reestablished through revolts that eventually unseat dominant groups after periods of war, and without any guarantee of better outcomes.

In spite of the difficulty of the subject, one conclusion can be drawn: violence is, above all, the result of types of processes of *embodiment*, and much less of types of processes of *ontological actualization*. Enlistment, be it into the military, law enforcement, or a paramilitary or criminal group signifies, exactly, the radicalization of the *spirit of submission* into the *spirit of subordination*. That is, an acceptance of severe sentences, above all sentences of social exclusion (such as

accusations of treason, but also prosecutions and torture) that all expect and understand, even those members of society who do not directly *embody* institutional violence. Once *embodied*, through direct or indirect subordination, violence can be triggered by instinctive acts, *ontologically actualized*; as it effectively happens with individuals subjected to particularly violent experiences, as is generally the case in poorer neighborhoods, juvenile homes, or among prosecuted peoples, such as the Roma (Gypsies), Native Americans and African Americans, the Untouchables or the Nepalese. Common people, including those employed by security forces, faced with evidence of abuses by the State or by other intimidating powers, subordinate themselves in the construction of social secrets around humanity´s dark side, turning it taboo.

Empathy is instinctive in human beings, but in society, the situation in which we obligatorily live, other emotions "of masses" develop and are provoked, such as fear and also shame: shame for not complying with social impositions, or for not respecting the natural empathy (8). As referred to by Bouthoul (1991/1961:368), even the leaders in a war can be scapegoated: they may not hesitate without losing the confidence of their own people, who are dominated by fear and shame. In the same way, in the opposite extreme of the social scale, as any prisoner can tell you, vacillation in front of others can also be very costly.

Showing fear to dogs, as everyone knows, is fatal if one wants to avoid problems with them. Shaming the fearful and social instigating individual bad behavior are ways of modifying the direction of action. Those experiences suggest the existence (shared between humans and canines, and probably other animal species) of innate *ontologically-actualized*-behaviors, in the face

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of violence, which are dictated by fear and shame. The associated feelings, in turn, can reveal the social fragilities and the pathways through which conflicts and alliances develop. The outlines of social groups can be confirmed precisely by studying the feelings of the individuals (as of dogs) in relation to their social position (integrated or excluded, secure or vulnerable). To understand such subtleties and the shadowy games in which they may be disguised – that is, to detect non-verbal communications – the proximity, and even the intimacy of the observer with the object of study is not required, but it helps, for only in that way it is possible to capture the subtle signals and sense the dangers that would otherwise escape an outsider (Elias and Scotson, 1994). A dynamic which becomes all the more evident when we take into account that modern societies evolved amidst violence, to be built on sentiments of repugnance (Elias, 1990/1939) – that is, civilized people substituted the fear of losing their lives, a near constant in medieval times, for the shame of breaking social bonds observed in today's complex societies (Dores, 2011b).

Table 5. *States of spirit* and principal social emotions (fear and shame).

Dangers for states of spirit	Human nature (fear)	Social nature (shame)
Spirit of prohibition	erect, serious expression denoting great power fear/surprise; furrowed brow, eyes open and raised eyebrows; surprise, shock, anxiety, nervousness, worry and terror	sadness (raised inner eyebrows), although attempting a smile
Spirit of submission		
Marginal spirit	fear of judgment	face behind the "happy mask"

The attention of the students for the principal social emotions perhaps shown in the pictures was not expressly asked. But some references were made to the subject, and synthesized in table 5.

The absence of references to these emotions in the case of the *spirit of submission may be one of* its comparative advantages: emotional calm. Just refraining from consciously acknowledging facts can actually lead to participating in the construction of social secrets. This would explain people's preference for adopting such a form of *ontological actualization*. However, that is not always convenient nor possible. "History will have to record that the greatest tragedy of this period of social transition was not the strident clamor of the bad people, but the appalling silence of the good people", said Martin Luther King, Jr. of his time. The mimetism biologically installed in our bodies, and the recursion or potential for creation of virtual worlds (orally, in books or in computer images) that characterize our existence as a species, demand great energy expenditures. For that reason, at the same time, they also demand energy saving strategies different from those employed by, for example, ants and bees.

In the case of humans there are no function-specific types, unlike the drones, workers and queens among the bees. By comparison with other animals, human beings are, on the whole, more similar than they are different. Whoever may have special functions, as war leaders, political representatives, or doctors, for example, must be willing to invest much more energy than the social average, at least during critical moments, when hesitating can put all of society at risk. Social functions do not come engraved on the human body: they are etched throughout life via

different socially *embodied habitus* through the intense exercise of *marginal* and *prohibition states of spirit*.

To save energy, people avoid strong emotions, especially fear and shame, which is not necessarily a good thing. The shame and fear of confronting dominant powers, that is, of antagonizing the spirit of prohibition and aligning with the marginal spirit (which, in any case, ontologically actualizes somewhere), make human societies vulnerable in the face of so-called "natural" disasters (Diamond, 2008/2005). The more extreme consequences of such events, provoked at times by human recklessness (for example, global warming as caused by the greenhouse effect), are often technically avoidable. Of course the energy expenditure by human beings invested into social processes protected by taboos, censorship, repression and other resources of power are much higher than the mean.

Table 6. *States of spirit*, feelings and emotions registered.

Actions States of spirit	Powers in flux (to voice)	Effective powers (to do)	Expectations of power (to sense)
Spirit of prohibition	ire and contempt resentment, indignation (violence) pride (superiority) (sarcasm, irony; self–confidence and determination; superiority)	ire expressive; emotions show on the face; (appeasing)	sadness fear/surprise; anxiety, nervousness, terror (astonishment, shock, preoccupation), (peace sign)
Spirit of submission		(confidence, joy)	(peace, transparency, openness, servitude)

Marginal spirit	(satisfaction) aversion (lack of interest and indifference) pride (superiority and untouchability)	(attention and fatigue) sad eyes, indignation, irritation and sadness sadness, serenity (preoccupation and patience) sadness (expectant) pride, contempt (superiority) repudiation and aversion; (dejection)	visceral anger, rage, aversion serene unrest indignation rage (determination and certainty)

In table 6, in parentheses are references to attitudes/ feelings. Without parentheses are references to emotions. Emotions are distinguished from feelings in that the former result from much faster neural circuitry than that employed in the production of attitudes/feelings (hereafter feelings, Damásio, 1994). A reaction to a fright, for example, starts by being emotional and only later becomes a feeling. Thus being frightened can become being amused, when the whole body reacts emotionally even if the first feeling immediately recognizes it to be a prank.

For the analysis of table 6, the following questions are presented: a) what is the distinction between the levels of reality we want to refer to – emotion or feeling; b) What are the types of articulation and interaction between the different levels of reality (between emotions and feelings) and the established recursion. Methodologically, it is necessary to refer to the actual difficulty of producing a rigorous distinction between emotions and feelings; the necessity of learning how to do this should be seen as one of the objectives in pursuit of an actualization and deepening of social theory.

The starting point here is the notion that emotions are visceral and urgent, channeling *ontological actualizations*, and reflexive second-hand feelings (Damásio, 1994). The feelings take more time to develop and express themselves, but are also more easily controlled and informed by ones will than emotions. They are also capable of driving *embodiment* processes – that is, influential in the way emotions are interpreted and communicated as good or bad, pleasurable or painful.

Table 6, like table 5, shows the absence of references to emotions in the case of the *spirit of submission* which is represented by stereotyped, dehumanized figures. The students gave attention above all to mimetic and embodied states; that is, those that are common in the people whose functional lives were specialized in the manner symbolized by the selected stylized figure.

The emotions and feelings of the *marginal* and *prohibition states of spirit* do not present clear differences between each other. Ire, indignation, sadness and pride, for example, appear in both. There is a difference of position more than of disposition in these two *sates of spirit*, as those who once averred to never assume positions of power only to find themselves in the situation of not only not refusing, but wanting to assume such social positions know all too well (Dores, 2012c).

Ontological Actualization, *Embodiment* and Expression: Emotions, Brain and Face

The study of the face presents science with the question of how its specialization is developing. The deepening of the knowledge of the face requires a lot of concentration, while at the

same time it needs a great deal of openness to other specialized fields of knowledge, such as neuroscience and the study of the brain, programing and computer sciences, facial reconstructive surgery and cosmetic surgery, the science of biometric facial identification systems, entertainment-world makeup and prosthetic makeup artists, the social studies of emotion and of the body, forensic psychology, etc.

Currently the social sciences are closed within themselves not only for reasons of guild interests, but, above all, due to epistemological limitations. These include the repugnance of considering violence and associated emotions as part of human nature, affording undeserved scientific status to the modern spirit (as identified by Hirshman, 1987 and Elias, 1990/1939). Another limitation is the individualist reductionism of the social, masked by the reification of society, and vice versa. All of this, in practice, translates into a centripetal and defensive epistemological regime for the production of knowledge, so specialized that it loses sight of the general existence framework of its objects of study, starting with society.

National sociologies, that serve state institutions' interest in researching national data, tend to disintegrate into the very politics they serve (be these public, educational, criminal, administrational, healthcare, justice, etc.), or to otherwise internationalize – around statistics from European nations as well as from other regions around the world. Global sociologies, working around data produced and problems dealt with by various international bodies, do not escape the reductive and reified duality with which they observe and approach people, nations, strategic regions and humanity. Psychology, anthropology, sociology, international relations, geography,

human rights, and other social disciplines, are detached from and sometimes in contraposition to each other.

In this framework of activity there is no place for the study of the face. We understand why. The face is a materialization of the complex mediation between the present, the past and the future; between the human being and the recursion that characterizes her; between doing, feeling and voicing; between capacities, potentialities and expectations; between habits, *habitus* and change; between cells, genes and existential experience. The Cartesian conception of social dimensions – that is, politics, economy, social status, culture – which directs the thinking in the social sciences is incapable of focusing on chaotic processes, such as those studied by meteorology. It presumes a difference of level between the material and spiritual worlds; between the bodies and the minds; between the organisms and the spirits. It renders homeostasis a mystery, just as the face – if by face we understand a place of convergence and expression of the bodies and minds, both individual and social, volitional and mimetic, powerful and submissive.

Table 7. Social dimensions and existential phenomena.

Social Dimensions Existential phenomena	Power (expression) (face)	Affiliation (embodiment) (brain)	Development (ontological actualization) (emotions)
Time	Present	Past	Future
Space	To do	To sense	To voice
Synergies	Capacities	Potentialities	Expectations
Energies	Habits	Habitus	Change
Organic materials	Cells	Genes	Experience

The study of the face can reduce itself to a subdiscipline of one or more social sciences, as merely another lateral chapel off of the central nave's dark void created by the Cartesian strategy. This would allow it time to ripen theoretically and methodologically. However, it presents us with a remarkable opportunity of constructive criticism for the necessary actualization of social theory, particularly opportune in the period of social transformation the western world is living through. Will social science be capable of ascending to the full status of science and, at the same time, help human kind realize itself (in particular by teaching people and institutions to combat the cognitive violence that is congenital to our species) and the dream of a humanity respectful of itself and nature?

Notes

1 Translated by Nuno Pontes, from Portuguese original. Avised by Arianna Silvestri.

2 Translator's Note (T.N.): The term used in the original Portuguese, "corporização", translates literally to "corporization". Ontological actualization was chosen as a more specific English term. Throughout this text ontological actualization is used as part of a larger concept including embodiment as its counterpart, being that the first is a process taking place from the inside out, and the second from the outside in.

3 Until not too many years ago these were not codified crimes, being merely types of unacknowledged social interaction.

4 By emotions, being understood an emergent homeostatic phenomenon (Damásio, 1994). By expression, being understood an ontological actualization of emotions more of less controlled, more or less achieved. By ontological actualization, being understood the homeostatic dialog between the whole and the parts of the body, living in existential instability as habit and as learning process.

5 T.N.: Here it is important to keep in mind that what we understand today as globalization is a process begun in the early 15th Century with the trans-oceanic expansion undertaken by the Portuguese, to soon thereafter be followed by the Spanish, then the Dutch; French, English, and so on, in a process that is yet to stop accelerating.

6 The sound emission spectra of the languages were identified by Tomatis (1991), who adopted therapeutic diagnostic audiometric techniques to his research, with practical results for the facilitation of language learning, now known as the Tomatis method.

7 I limit myself to citing only these ideologies for being those that most promote social violence (Garcia, 2003, who cited data from the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.mipt.org.

8 On this topic, read Thomas Scheff, 1990 and 2011.

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Appendix

Table 8. Synthesis of the principal characteristics of the *states of spirit,* observed by the students in the selected pictures

Actions States of spirit	Powers in flux (to voice)	Effective powers (to do)	Expectations of power (to sense)

Spirit of prohibition	tough, serious expression and of great power ire and contempt revolt, hostility, resentment, indignation and even violence mouth open, eyes half closed, flared nostrils, tensed forehead and nose, lowered eyebrows and raised chin (superiority and pride) inscrutable face, sometimes with a hint of a smile, sarcastic or ironic when giving chores to the government or speaking about the nations governance. The posture always projects self-confidence and determination, with an air of superiority	"light", an easy smile attracts participation ire (directed at a specific situation), given the way in which the eyes and mouth are open eyes open, flared nostrils, lowered eyebrows, hard chin, relaxed forehead (botox?) and open mouth expressive; emotions show on the face; palms up in a show of openness and appeasement	sadness (inner eyebrows raised), although trying to smile fear/surprise; furrowed brow, eyes open with eyebrows raised; astonishment, shock, anxiety, nervousness, preoccupation and terror eyes open, mouth open horizontally, furrowed brow, raised cheeks, flared nostrils and arched eyebrows neutral expression, with an affable and welcoming smile; opens eyes wide to call attention; shows palms in a sign of peace
Spirit of submission	closed eyes, furrowing forehead and eyebrows. Pursed lips (semi-close). Tensed cheeks dropped and slightly joined eyebrows; drooping upper and slightly tensed lower eyelids; descending movement of the tensed nostrils; stilled cheeks; closed, tensed mouth; tense chin	slightly closed eyes, a wry and seductive smile. Relaxed forehead and eyebrows; relaxed, confident posture. Jaunting chin and tensed cheeks (tensed up and back) – confidence, joy drooping eyelids; flared nostrils; closed mouth; tensed chin and a slight contraction of the eyebrows at the center	raised head, furrowing of the forehead and eyebrows, memorable gaze, open eyes, relaxed closed mouth and movement of the cheeks – peace, dedication to transparency, openness and servitude tensed lower eyelids; closed, tensed mouth; descending movement of contracted nostrils; tensed, slightly furrowed chin; unmoving cheeks

Marginal spirit	contrast between middle (lowering) and upper (rising) parts of the face. Shape of the nose converges on the lower part of the face, with the mouth turned down on the right side and up on the left side, in the direction of the addressee head thrown back with pride; eyes wide open face behind the "happy mask" face and gaze to the side; relaxed muscles wearing accessories, look forward, head to one side (aversion?), lack of interest and indifference by what or whom surrounds him, raising of eyebrows; closing/tension in the words; raising corners of the mouth; lifting of the cheeks; pride, superiority and untouchability	balance in the lower part of the face, aggressive look, smile capable of seducing and bothering. Difference between one side eye and eyebrow and the other side; left side signaling warning, alert, and fatigue; right side uniform scrunched eyebrows, sad eyes, closed mouth: indignation, irritation and sadness Worry, sadness, but serenity and patience Ascending gaze, open eyes, the corners of the mouth drooped in expectant sadness Facial asymmetry, direct gaze, asymmetric upper smile (superiority and pride). exhibition of power and contempt lowering of eyelids; eyes semi open; raised upper lip; lips separate; lowering of lower lip; repudiation and aversion; dejection	mouth closed, penetrating and cutting gaze, focus on something with such power that the whole face seems chocked for not being able to release visceral ire, anger, aversion serene but restless face, attentive eyes, subtle smile flushed, backed up by gestures, eyes wide open and mouth expressing indignation Gaze is intense, determined; scrunched eyebrows and closed mouth in preparation for action Serenity communicated by the absence of movement on the face, partial closing of the eyes in concentration, looking into the horizon, to the challenges ahead, determination demonstrated by the slight facial contraction/tension Lowering of the tension of the eyebrows; pursing of the lips; gaze fixed upon the horizon; determination and assuredness, anger